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Understanding What was Said 
 
 
 
Guy Longworth 
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On the most prominent account, understanding what was said is 
always propositional knowledge of what was said. I develop a more 
minimal alternative, according to which understanding is 
sometimes a distinctive attitude towards what was said—to a first 
approximation, entertaining what was said. The propositional 
knowledge account has been supported on the basis of its capacity 
to explain testimonial knowledge transmission. I argue that it is 
not so supported. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction. The capacity to understand what people say supports 
a momentous extension of one’s knowledge-gathering powers. Most 
importantly, it enables one to acquire knowledge at second hand from 
others’ testimony. In the absence of that ability, our intellectual lives 
would be, at best, radically impoverished. The capacity can also provide 
one with knowledge about speakers, through making available to one 
their expressions of psychological states and episodes. And, of course, 
the capacity can enable one to know what people say. The ability to 
understand is one of our central epistemic powers. For that reason, it 
has been common to treat the outputs of exercises of that ability—
states of understanding what someone said—as propositional knowledge 
about what they said. In opposition to that treatment, I defend the 
entertaining account, according to which understanding what someone 
said consists in entertaining the proposition they, rather than in 
entertaining a proposition about that proposition. 
In many cases, it’s plausibly a necessary condition on coming to 
know something on the basis of what someone says that one hears, or 
otherwise perceives, their utterance. But it’s possible to hear an 
utterance without understanding it, even if one is competent with the 
language. Moreover, it seems possible to grasp the meanings of words 
and sentences that were used in an utterance without yet understanding 
what was said—for example, where those sentences involve 
demonstratives or other context-sensitive expressions. What does 
understanding what was said add to hearing utterances and grasping 
their linguistic meanings? According to the most prominent account, 
which I’ll refer to as the propositional knowledge account, understanding 
what someone said when they said that p consists invariably in acquiring 
a piece of propositional knowledge to the effect that they said that p. 
(Campbell 1982; Dummett 1978, 1991; Davies 1989; Evans 1982; Heck 
1995; Higginbotham 1992; McDowell 1994.) In what follows, I present 
reasons for thinking that understanding can take other forms and that it 
is possible to understand what was said without knowing what was said. 
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One problem for the propositional knowledge account is that it’s 
plausible that one can know what a speaker said without understanding 
their utterance, for instance in cases in which one comes to know what 
they said on the basis of subtitles or other forms of testimony. More 
carefully, it’s plausible that there are basic forms of understanding that 
are absent in such cases. (See Hunter 1998; Pettit 2002; Fricker 2003.) 
One kind of account that avoids that difficulty holds that understanding 
an utterance is a specific way of knowing, just as seeing that such-and-
such and remembering that such-and-such are specific ways of knowing. 
On this account, understanding what someone said requires knowing 
what they said in a specific way, where that way is not present—or not 
clearly present—in cases in which one knows what someone said on the 
basis of subtitles or testimony. 
A minimal view of seeing that such-and-such is that it amounts to 
knowing that such-and-such on the (perhaps concurrent) basis of seeing. And 
one can see something—for instance, a desk, covered in papers—
without seeing that the desk is covered in papers. A minimal view of 
understanding, analogous to the treatment of seeing, would be the 
following. Understanding that someone said that p is a matter of 
knowing that they said that such-and-such on the (perhaps concurrent) basis 
of understanding what they said. On such a view, understanding what was 
said is treated, like seeing, not as a way of knowing, but as a distinct 
state that is capable of providing the initial grounds for pieces of 
knowledge. Should we allow that, as in the case of seeing, it’s possible to 
understand what someone said without knowing that they said it?  
Where a speaker said that p, taking in what they said plausibly 
requires that one comes to bear attitudes towards the proposition that 
p—that one comes in some appropriate way to entertain that 
proposition. And one way of doing that might be to come to know that 
the speaker said p. However, it’s plausible that one might take in what 
someone said in a case in which one had apparent grounds to believe 
that one was hallucinating, or had misleading (apparent) evidence that 
the speaker couldn’t have said what they appeared to say. In such cases, 
one’s (apparent) grounds or evidence might prevent one from knowing 
that the speaker said that p, but would nonetheless be consistent with 
one’s understanding what they said. That would align the case of 
understanding what was said with that of seeing objects, since one can 
see objects while precluded—for example, by misleading apparent 
evidence—from knowing that they are there. In what follows, I draw on 
a partial analogy with object-directed seeing in order to develop an 
account on which understanding is possible in the absence of 
propositional knowledge of what was said. 
The propositional knowledge account of understanding finds 
support from two functions of understanding in sustaining the 
acquisition of knowledge: its function in sustaining knowledge of what 
was said; and its function in sustaining knowledge gained on the basis of 
what was said. 
When we judge that an auditor understands what a speaker said, 
we are ordinarily willing to judge that they know what the speaker said. 
And it’s plausible that an audience knows what a speaker said just in 
case, for some fact to the effect that the speaker said that p, the 
audience knows that fact. Hence, we are ordinarily willing to infer from 
the fact that an auditor understands what a speaker said, in a case in 
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which the speaker said that p, that the auditor knows that the speaker 
said that p. However, our willingness to reason in that way doesn’t show 
that the propositional knowledge account is correct. Our judgments 
might be due not to tacit acceptance of the propositional knowledge 
account, but rather to our sensitivity to the way that understanding non-
constitutively, but reliably, gives rise to knowledge, at least amongst 
typical adults. Compare here the fact that when we judge that a typical 
adult sees a cat, we are ordinarily willing to judge that they know that 
there’s a cat there, despite the fact that we would also accept that it’s 
possible to see a cat without recognizing it as such. 
A more powerful seeming argument in support of the 
propositional knowledge account arises from the function of 
understanding in the transmission of knowledge by testimony. In 
preliminary form, the argument is this. There seem to be cases with the 
following pair of properties. First, they are cases in which knowledge is 
transmitted via testimony. Second, they are cases in which the 
audience’s understanding of testimony could only facilitate their 
acquisition of knowledge if understanding met appropriate epistemic 
conditions. Driving the consideration is the thought that if 
understanding had a lesser epistemic status than knowledge, or had a 
status that failed to put one who understood in a position to know what 
was said, then it would impose that lesser status as an upper bound on 
any states that were acquired on its basis. In that case, understanding 
what someone said would seem to preclude, rather than facilitate, the 
transmission of knowledge. Consider, for example, a case in which one 
believed correctly that a speaker said that smoking is dangerous and 
came, on the basis of that belief together with knowledge that one’s 
interlocutor spoke truly, to believe that smoking is dangerous. If one’s 
belief about what was said failed to amount to knowledge—for example, 
if it were formed on the basis of a lucky guess—then it is plausible that 
one’s belief that smoking is dangerous would not amount to knowledge. 
Hence, it is plausible that the understanding operative in such cases 
must suffice for knowledge of what was said. (Versions of this argument 
are presented in Dummett 1978; Evans 1982: 310–11; Heck 1995.) Again, 
however, the analogy with seeing can help us to see ways of responding 
to this type of argument. It’s plausible that although seeing an object is 
not a form of knowing, it typically puts one in a position to know. 
Similarly, the sketched argument fails to rule out that understanding an 
utterance can put one in a position to know things without itself being a 
form of knowledge. 
My aim here is to exploit gaps in the sketched argument for the 
propositional knowledge account in order to make out the possibility of 
an alternative account, the entertaining account. I begin (§2) by developing 
the entertaining account in more detail. Then, in §3, I return to the role 
of understanding in facilitating the transmission of knowledge by 
testimony. I argue that the propositional knowledge account is not 
supported by its capacity to figure in explanations of testimonial 
knowledge transmission. I propose a treatment of knowledge 
transmission that embeds the alternative, in my view superior, 
entertaining account of understanding. That serves to undercut the 
purported justification for the propositional knowledge account. 
Furthermore, it does so in a way that exhibits the advantages of the 
alternative account over accounts that, like the propositional knowledge 
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account, make understanding a form of cognition about what is said, 
rather than a way of entertaining the propositional content of what was 
said. In §4, I briefly compare the entertaining account with alternative 
accounts proposed by Dean Pettit (2002) and Elizabeth Fricker (2003). 
 
 
2. An entertaining account. Understanding what a speaker said 
determines, from the audience’s perspective, that the speaker said what 
they did. In doing so, it performs two tasks. First, it determines, in the 
following sense, that the speaker said what they did: one couldn’t be in 
the same state of understanding in a case in which the speaker did not 
say what they did. Second, it performs the first task in a way that 
enables the speaker’s saying what they did to shape the audience’s 
perspective. Since knowledge is factive—that is, since knowing that p 
entails p—the propositional knowledge account deals with the first task. 
And since knowing is a state of mind, or is closely bound up with 
occupying specific states of mind, it plausibly deals with the second.  
How could psychological states or episodes other than states of 
propositional knowledge determine facts about what a speaker said? 
Consider here how the perception of objects can function in the 
acquisition of knowledge. In propitious circumstances, seeing an object, 
and its particular features and activities, can put suitably equipped 
subjects in a position to know that the object is present, and that it is 
disposed in one or another way. Consider a subject who is equipped with 
the concept chair together with an ability reliably to deploy that concept 
in response to what they see. In propitious circumstances, seeing a chair 
can put such a subject in a position to know that a chair is present. 
Plausibly, this is because seeing a chair is knowledge enabling. Seeing a 
chair is impossible unless there is a chair there to be seen. Seeing a chair 
provides a guarantee, from the subject’s perspective, of the chair’s 
presence. The chair’s presence in turn guarantees the fact that the chair 
is present. Seeing the chair thus underwrites a necessary condition on 
being in a position to know that the chair is present, by determining, 
from the subject’s perspective, the fact that the chair is present. If one is 
to know that there is a chair there, what is required in addition to 
merely seeing the chair is the appropriate exercise of suitable conceptual 
capacities—capacities that exploit the perceived presence of the chair in 
order to furnish one with reliable propositional cognition of the chair 
and its location. (See e.g. Kalderon 2011.) 
What would be an analogous account of understanding as a basis 
for knowledge of what was said? Here, in five stages, is a sketch of such 
an account, the entertaining account. The entertaining account begins 
(at stage one) from reflection on subjects’ abilities to have in mind, and 
bring to mind, propositional contents. Normal human subjects are able 
to think a variety of propositional contents. For example, they may be 
able to think, or entertain, the propositional contents that it’s raining, 
that smoking is dangerous, or that second-order logic is existentially 
committing. Subjects can also bring to mind such contents, as when they 
suppose that, or wonder whether, or idly consider how. I’ll use ‘think’, 
‘entertain’, and their cognates as generic terms for the various 
propositional attitudes or cognitive modes involved in engaging 
propositional contents. 
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Such thinking is classifiable both by appeal to the propositional 
contents that it engages and by appeal to the general types of attitude 
that it involves. Focusing on the first dimension, one might associate 
episodes of thinking with the propositional content that smoking is 
dangerous and distinguish them from those that engage the proposition 
that second-order logic is existentially committing. Focusing on the 
second, one might associate episodes of thinking that engage a 
propositional content in the mode of supposing, and distinguish them 
from episodes of wondering, idly considering, and so forth. The 
classification picks up on functional or explanatory differences in the 
ways that various forms of thinking shape, and are shaped by, the rest of 
a subject’s cognitive economy. And corresponding to the two 
dimensions of classification are a range of different abilities—for 
example, the (possibly complex) ability to have attitudes to the 
propositional content that smoking is dangerous and the ability to 
suppose things. 
The first stage of the account appeals to the idea that some of the 
abilities exercised in actively bringing contents to mind can also be 
triggered in other ways. If one is suitably equipped, then one’s abilities 
to think a propositional content can be triggered from without by one’s 
being confronted, in perception, with an utterance that bears that 
content. Thus, perceptual confrontation with an utterance can bring it 
about that one engages a particular content, that one thinks it. For 
instance, a competent English speaker’s perception of an utterance of 
“Smoking is dangerous” might bring it about that they entertained the 
proposition that smoking is dangerous. That way in which the exercise 
of one’s thinking abilities can be triggered determines a particular range 
of propositional attitudes. Members of the range bear the functional 
mark of their having been triggered, or seemingly triggered, by 
confrontation with an utterance or some other concrete bearer of the 
content. The functional or explanatory roles of outputs of such 
externally triggered exercises of thinking abilities will differ from the 
roles of otherwise similar outputs that are not externally triggered, or 
whose instances are not of a nature to be externally triggered in that 
way. (The functional difference here is broadly analogous to that 
between sensory experience and sensory imagination. For present 
purposes, we can remain neutral about the explanatory, as opposed to 
expository, priority of active vs. externally triggered entertaining.) I’ll 
say more about the functional or explanatory differences between the 
target range and other types of attitude below. 
Thus far, we have the idea that there are propositional attitudes 
that are triggered by perceptual encounters with utterances. That idea 
doesn’t require that the contents of such attitudes converge with 
contents expressed in the triggering utterance. But understanding an 
utterance does require that one engage the content expressed by the 
utterance. The second stage of the account aims to ensure that the 
mode of engagement to which it appeals meets this additional 
condition. The result is secured by imposing an additional requirement 
on the attitudes that constitute understanding. In addition to being 
triggered by perceptual confrontation with a concrete vehicle, those 
attitudes must be triggered—or by nature apt to be triggered—by 
confrontation with an appropriate vehicle, one that in fact bears the 
content that’s so engaged. (It’s plausible that the standing properties of 
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a sentence do not determine all of the contents borne by utterances of 
it. The machinery that enables subjects to meet this condition must 
therefore be sensitive to the effects of other—broadly pragmatic—
determinants.) 
The third stage of the account specifies in more detail the 
attitudes that constitute understanding. Crucially, the generic attitude 
that constitutes understanding is a form of first-order engagement with 
the propositional content expressed in an utterance, a way of thinking 
that very content, as opposed to thinking about that content. That is, 
it’s a mode of engagement with what was said, rather than a mode of 
engagement with a different content that presents what was said as 
having been said. Believing that smoking is dangerous differs from 
believing that it has been said that smoking is dangerous. The former 
belief is apt to make a committed smoker question their practices, while 
the latter is apt only to make them question their sources. Similarly, 
understanding it to have been said that smoking is dangerous differs 
from engaging the content that it has been said that smoking is 
dangerous. The latter mode of engagement is immediately with the 
content that it has been said that smoking is dangerous, and only 
derivatively with the content that smoking is dangerous. Thinking that 
it has been said that smoking is dangerous might have as a necessary 
condition that one engages the content that smoking is dangerous at 
first-order. (That would be an upshot of, for example, Tyler Burge’s 
Principle and Stronger Principle for Canonical Names of Senses (2005: 174ff).) 
But the attitude to the content that it has been said that smoking is 
dangerous will typically differ from the mode of first order engagement 
that it necessitates. This is so for reasons analogous to those responsible 
for the fact that engaging the content that smoking is dangerous as a 
merely necessary condition of believing that it has been said that 
smoking is dangerous and is not a way of believing that smoking is 
dangerous. As will be explained more fully in §3, this is the most 
fundamental difference between the entertaining account and the 
propositional knowledge account. Unlike the entertaining account, the 
propositional knowledge account treats understanding as a mode of 
entertaining a proposition about expressed propositions, and so a mode 
of entertaining expressed propositions at second order. 
The first-order propositional attitude that is instigated on the 
basis of perceptual confrontation with appropriate vehicles can be 
characterized loosely in English as understanding, or as understanding it to 
have been said. For instance, confrontation with an utterance of the 
sentence, “Smoking is dangerous,” might lead a subject to understand it 
to have been said that smoking is dangerous. We can leave open 
whether that characterization is entirely appropriate; for present 
purposes, it can be treated as a partial stipulation. One way in which the 
characterization in terms of understanding it to have been said is 
inappropriate is in carrying the suggestion that the attitude so 
characterized is somehow composed from more basic forms, that it 
involves understanding targeted onto it having been said, with the latter 
targeted onto the propositional content of a saying. That suggestion is 
rejected by the entertaining account, on which the attitude of 
understanding is targeted immediately onto the latter propositional 
content.  Another way in which the characterization requires careful 
handling will be mentioned below. 
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Making use of a suitably broad notion of object, we can view the 
target propositional attitudes, like other such attitudes, as directed 
towards a special range of propositional objects, in this case expressed 
propositional contents. (Important defenses of treatments of 
propositional attitudes in general as object-directed may be found in 
King 2002 and Schiffer 2003. However, the entertaining account need 
not be bound to any specific treatment of attitudes and is compatible 
with any treatment that distinguishes thinking a proposition from 
thinking about a proposition. Thus, it is compatible with alternative 
treatments presented by, e.g., King, Soames, and Speaks 2014; 
Moltmann 2003; Pietroski 2000; Pryor 2007; Rosefeldt 2008.)  So 
viewed, attitudes of understanding are in some ways akin to seeing an 
object. In the cases both of seeing an object and understanding what 
was said, it is crucial to distinguish between being in a (potentially 
cognitively rewarding) relation to a thing, and being in an attitudinal 
relation to a thought that involves a certain concept of that thing. In the 
case of seeing, one may see a cat without having propositional 
knowledge that the cat exists; similarly one can understand what 
someone who said that p said without knowing that someone said that p, 
where the latter piece of knowledge is about the proposition that p. 
However, quite different forms of psychological equipment are required 
in order to stand in the relation of understanding to what was said than 
are involved in, for example, seeing a cat. One must have a suitable range 
of sense-perceptual capacities in both cases. But in the case of 
understanding, unlike the case of seeing an object, one must possess a 
specific range of conceptual resources, abilities to entertain in one’s 
thinking the specific contents of target utterances. And one must 
possess the ability to have those resources triggered through perception 
of an appropriate utterance, an ability that includes competence with 
the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic factors that shape what 
utterances of that type can be used to say. For another difference, seeing 
a cat typically involves awareness of some aspects of the cat’s 
appearance, while engagement with propositional content involves no 
analogous awareness of appearances of the propositional content. The 
process through which one comes to engage a propositional content in 
understanding may involve awareness of appearances of an utterance 
through which the propositional content is engaged. But such 
appearances are not appearances of what is engaged, the propositional 
content. For propositional contents are abstract in such a way that they 
lack straightforward analogues of perceptible appearances. (Cp. Church 
1951: 104.) 
Like other forms of intellectual or perceptual engagement with 
environmental objects—for instance, cases of propositional knowing or 
of seeing objects—understanding something to have been said is subject 
to various requirements in addition to those already outlined. The 
requirements apply both to subjects and also to their relations to their 
environments. The fourth stage of the account involves saying 
something about those requirements. For present purposes, we can leave 
somewhat open the precise form taken by the pertinent requirements. 
But if understanding something to have been said is to sub-serve the 
acquisition and transmission of knowledge then it will be subject to a 
range of broadly epistemic requirements.  
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One such requirement is that understanding something to have 
been said is environment involving, in the following specific way: one 
cannot understand it to have been said that p unless it has been said that 
p. (This is another way in which our theoretical notion might appear to 
differ from English ‘understanding it to have been said’, since the latter 
seems to allow for misunderstanding of various sorts, for states of merely 
seeming understanding.) Indeed, a stronger condition is plausible: one 
cannot understand it to have been said that p unless one instances a 
mode of engagement with the proposition that p that was appropriately 
shaped by confrontation with an utterance in which that proposition 
was expressed. (We can leave open here whether such shaping is 
constitutive or merely causal.) A related demand, again deriving from 
the connections that understanding has with knowledge, is that the 
outputs of exercises of one’s ability to understand should correlate safely 
with what was in fact said in one’s presence. At least in cases where 
understanding can give rise to knowledge, there should not be too much 
danger that, in threateningly similar circumstances, it would have 
seemed to one that one understood something to have been said that 
had not in fact been said. However, since knowledge arises through the 
combined exercises of the power of understanding and conceptual 
abilities, only the combination as a whole is required to meet such 
conditions on knowledge. It may be that the contribution of 
understanding to the transaction requires it to meet conditions distinct 
from the safety condition on knowledge. Perhaps, for example, what was 
said must figure constitutively in one’s understanding, where that’s 
consistent with there being significant danger of one’s suffering a mere 
ringer for understanding proper. For present purposes, the main point is 
that the required conditions will correspond, in appropriate ways, with 
at least some requirements on knowing that someone said that p. To 
that extent, it is natural to expect that the requirements will track—or 
bear close analogies with—requirements on seeing objects. For both 
seeing and understanding involve engagement with features of one’s 
environment that can support the acquisition of knowledge, at least in 
otherwise propitious circumstances and for subjects in possession of 
suitable cognitive equipment. (For relevant discussion, see again 
Kalderon 2011.) 
According to the entertaining account, understanding what was 
said can take the form of first-order engagement with what was said—a 
propositional attitude with a propositional content that was expressed 
in one’s presence. It’s a specific form of engagement with such content, 
the upshot of exercises of an ability to have such engagements triggered 
by perceptual confrontation with appropriate utterances. And it is a 
form of engagement that meets broadly epistemic requirements, akin to 
requirements on seeing objects. To a good first approximation, it is a 
form of engagement with what was said suitable to put those who enjoy 
it in a position to know what was said. But it will give rise to such 
knowledge only amongst subjects who meet conditions in addition to 
those required for bare understanding.  
The conditions on acquiring propositional knowledge of what was 
said outstrip those on understanding what was said in at least three 
ways. First, in order to acquire knowledge on the basis of understanding, 
subjects must have an appropriate conceptual repertoire. In particular, 
they must have a concept of saying (or a suitably correlative concept) 
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together with a range of concepts that enable them to think, at second 
order, about the propositional content that they engage at first order 
through understanding. So, in order to know on the basis of 
understanding that it has been said that smoking is dangerous, a subject 
must have and exercise not only an ability to entertain the proposition 
that smoking is dangerous, but also an appropriate ability to think about 
saying and an appropriate ability to think about the propositional 
content that smoking is dangerous. Second, in order to acquire 
knowledge subjects must have abilities to apply the required range of 
concepts appropriately in their specific circumstances. It is not enough 
that subjects have an ability to think thoughts about what is said. They 
must in addition be able reliably to form correct beliefs or judgments 
about what was said in presented episodes of speech. Third, in order to 
come to know what was said on an occasion, subjects must exercise the 
relevant abilities in ways that meet operative epistemic standards. Their 
abilities must be exercised properly, in a way that is suitably sensitive to 
potential defeating conditions and the like.  Subjects who understand 
what was said and who meet the additional conditions with respect to 
what was said can thereby come to know what was said. 
Amongst typical adult humans, the respective requirements on 
bare understanding and on possession of knowledge will run in step. 
Typical adult humans possess the conceptual and applicational abilities 
required for acquiring knowledge of what was said across a range of 
circumstances. The account therefore provides support for the pattern 
of ordinary judgment linking understanding and propositional 
knowledge with which we began. But similarly, a typical adult human 
who sees a cat will know that there is a cat before them. In neither case 
does the normal acceptability of the form of inference show that the 
input conditions are forms of knowledge. 
The propositional knowledge account has it that our cognitive and 
epistemic states determine what was said in our presence by 
determining our standing with respect to a proposition about what was 
said. By contrast, the present account has it that our cognitive and 
epistemic states determine what was said in our presence by 
determining a particular kind of standing with respect to what was said, a 
standing that one can have only as a distinctive kind of response to that 
propositional content’s having been expressed in one’s presence. Rather 
than seeking to explain understanding by appeal to a generic attitude of 
knowing together with a distinctive range of contents about what was 
said, the entertaining account places more of the explanatory burden on 
the distinctive type of attitude involved in understanding. That enables 
the entertaining account to treat understanding as a form of immediate 
cognitive engagement with what was said, rather than a form of indirect 
engagement via knowledge that it was said. 
Plausibly, there are limits to the load-bearing capacity of the 
attitude dimension. It would be implausible to build the identification 
of specific sources of what is understood—that is, the identification of 
particular speakers, occasions of speaking, or utterances—into 
distinctions amongst attitudes so that, for example, understanding what 
Peter said involved a different attitude from understanding what Paul 
said (assuming that Peter ¹ Paul). Moreover, the ability of one who 
understands what was said to identify their sources seems to play an 
essential role in accounting for cases of testimony. The issues here are 
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delicate and I can’t pursue them in detail. However, there is no 
immediate reason to think that they constitute a threat to the 
entertaining account. For present purposes, we can take it that a 
complete account of the required abilities will make appeal to the 
integration of states of bare understanding as characterized here with 
sensory perception of sources or episodes of speech that are so 
understood. (For further discussion, see Longworth 2008b.) 
The fifth stage of exposition focuses on understanding assertions 
and further develops the analogy between seeing objects and 
understanding utterances. It’s natural to characterize seeing an object as 
providing an invitation to belief in that, despite the possibility of 
withholding belief, seeing an object is not neutral with respect to how 
things are in one’s local environment. Rather, seeing an object will 
typically induce one to treat one’s environment as though the object 
were as it appears. Amongst suitably equipped subjects, so treating one’s 
environment involves believing it to be as it appears. Seeing an object 
does not merely indicate to one the possibility of so believing. Seeing has 
authority over belief. Similarly, in understanding an assertion, one is 
presented with an invitation not only to form beliefs about what the 
speaker has said, but also to believe that one’s environment is as the 
assertor thereby presents it. If the assertion is to the effect that smoking 
is dangerous, then understanding it provides one with an invitation to 
believe that smoking is dangerous. Although understanding such an 
assertion involves engaging the content that smoking is dangerous at 
first order, it does not—or need not—involve accepting that content. It 
will not do so if one has, or if one takes oneself to have, sufficiently 
weighty reasons for doubting the competence or sincerity of the 
assertor. However, although it’s possible to understand an assertion 
without accepting what is asserted, one’s understanding indicates more 
than the mere possibility that things are as they have been asserted to 
be. With respect to cases in which one has no special reason for doubt, 
Michael Dummett’s characterization is apt: 
 
I go through no process of reasoning, however swift, to arrive at the 
conclusion that he has spoken aright: my understanding of his utterance 
and my acceptance of his assertion are one. (Dummett 1993: 419). 
 
That tells us something about the cognitive role of understanding 
assertions. However, we can also understand what is said in, for 
example, questions and commands. The propositional knowledge 
account deals effortlessly with differences amongst these cases of 
understanding on the basis of the differences between knowing that 
someone has asserted that p, knowing that someone has asked whether 
p, and knowing that someone has commanded that p. And it might be 
thought that the entertaining account cannot capture the different 
cognitive roles of understanding what was said that are appropriate to 
utterances with those other forces. That thought would be premature, 
however. For the entertaining account can exploit the attitude 
dimension in order to capture the required distinctions. In doing so, it 
treats understanding assertions as the responsibility of one way of 
entertaining what was said, and understanding questions and commands 
as the responsibility of other ways of entertaining what was said. To a 
first approximation, the attitude distinctively involved in understanding 
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questions provides invitations to act—that is, by answering the 
questions—while the attitude distinctively involved in understanding 
commands provides invitations to act, or to form intentions to act, in 
fulfillment of the commands. Although there is more to say about the 
cognitive roles of each of these ways of entertaining what was said, there 
is no immediate reason to suppose that this represents an issue of 
principle as opposed to detail. Furthermore, the issues of detail here 
arise just as much for the propositional knowledge account, pending a 
full analysis of the cognitive roles of thought about things said with the 
various forces. 
Let’s recap. First, understanding is an attitude towards what was 
said that is triggered by perceptual confrontation with an utterance. 
Second, the content to which one bears that attitude must be a content 
expressed by the utterance that triggers one’s engagement. Third, and 
centrally, the attitude constitutes a first-order mode of engagement with 
the expressed content. Fourth, the attitude is subject to broadly 
epistemic requirements, shaped in part by the fact that understanding 
can give rise to knowledge of what was said. Fifth, understanding 
assertions can present invitations to form beliefs about the wider 
environment in accord with what was asserted. It’s clear, in outline, that 
the account is well placed to figure in explaining how understanding can 
give rise to knowledge. Crucially, and by contrast with the propositional 
knowledge account, the account treats understanding as a form of first-
order attitude with what was said as its content, rather than an attitude 
to a content about what was said. In the next section, the importance of 
this difference between the present account and the propositional 
knowledge account is illustrated, and exploited, in a comparative 
assessment of the ways in which the two accounts deal with our 
engagements with bits of testimony. 
 
 
3. Comparative assessment of the two accounts. The epistemological 
proximity of the two candidate accounts might lead one to think that if 
the entertaining account applied to a subject, then so would the 
propositional knowledge account. However, even if that were correct it 
would not follow that satisfaction of conditions in the entertaining 
account guarantees satisfaction of conditions in the knowledge account. 
And even if that were guaranteed, the relative explanatory priority of 
the two accounts would remain open. For example, it’s consistent with 
the claim that all typical subjects of seeing thereby acquire knowledge 
about their surroundings that their seeing figures in explaining their 
knowledge, rather than being constituted by that knowledge. Similarly, 
it’s consistent with the claim that all typical subjects of understanding 
thereby acquire knowledge that their understanding explains their 
knowledge and is not constituted by it. In that way, one might hold that 
seeing objects invariably gives rise to perceptual knowledge without 
viewing any further consequences of that knowledge as over-determined 
by the conjunction of seeing and knowledge, since the perceptual 
knowledge would be dependent upon the seeing. Similarly, one might 
hold that understanding invariably gives rise to knowledge without 
viewing the further consequences of the knowledge as over-determined.  
There is, therefore, a significant obstacle in the way of attempts to 
defend the propositional knowledge account by appeal to the role of 
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understanding in sponsoring testimonial knowledge. We saw earlier (§1) 
that such an attempt might be based on the claim that if understanding 
what was said were not a form of propositional knowledge, then it would 
block, rather than facilitate, the transmission of knowledge. However, 
showing that propositional knowledge of what was said figures 
essentially in the transmission of knowledge by testimony would not 
suffice for such a defense. In addition, it must be shown that the sort of 
attitude characterized by the entertaining account is inessential to the 
acquisition of knowledge of what was said. However, I propose to 
bypass that difficulty in order more directly to compare the treatments 
of testimony supported by the competing accounts. I’ll argue that the 
entertaining account is capable of sustaining a treatment of testimony 
on which it can enable the transmission of knowledge even in the 
absence of propositional knowledge of what was said. And I’ll argue 
that, by comparison with the entertaining account, the propositional 
knowledge account provides an over-intellectualized treatment of the 
role that understanding plays in accounting for the warranted 
acceptance of testimony.  
Let’s begin by considering a propositional knowledge based 
treatment of a subject’s warrant for accepting what someone said. The 
account begins from (P1), the purported output of understanding what 
was said. 
 
(P1) A knows what S said (i.e., A knows that S said that p). 
 
Since our focus is on the role of understanding in testimonial warrant, 
rather than more general questions about the warrant for treating 
testimony as true, we can assume that A has a knowledge sustaining 
warrant for accepting that what S said is true: 
 
(P2) A knows that what S said is true. 
 
(P1) and (P2) then serve as lemmas for an inference, on the basis of 
which A comes to accept what they were told, and so we reach (C): 
 
(C) A accepts what S said (i.e., A accepts that p). 
 
What is required is an account of how the state of acceptance 
characterized in (C) can be warranted by the states of knowledge 
characterized in (P1) and (P2). The first piece of knowledge guarantees 
that A’s view about what S said reliably reflects what S in fact said. The 
second secures warrant for accepting that what S said is true. What is 
wanted, then, is an account of how those guarantees transmit to the 
state of acceptance characterized in (C). The most natural treatment is 
inferential. Since (C) is required to be inferentially dependent upon (P1) 
and (P2), we have the earlier advertised justification for the claim that 
the state characterized in (C) could amount to knowledge only if A’s 
understanding of what was said also amounted to knowledge. (In fact, 
it’s arguable that one might know that p on the basis of inference in 
cases in which one doesn’t know the premises of the inference. See e.g. 
Arnold 2013; Fitelson 2010; Klein 2008; Warfield 2005. Perhaps, for 
example, it is possible to come to know that p by inference from the 
belief that everyone said that p in cases in which the latter belief isn’t 
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(quite) true. Since allowing that possibility would only weaken the case 
for the propositional knowledge account, I propose to ignore it.) 
The problem with this purported justification for the 
propositional knowledge account is that the inference connecting the 
states in (P1) and (P2) with the state in (C) is enthymematic. Our next 
task, then, will be to shore up that inferential connection. Doing so will 
help to reveal the extent to which the treatment is more intellectually 
demanding than a treatment based on the entertaining account.  
Knowing what a speaker said is an unspecified form of knowing 
with a propositional object picked out by the complementizer phrase, 
‘what the speaker said’. To a close approximation, it’s a matter of 
knowing that p, where p is a full and correct answer to the question: 
‘what did the speaker say?’ (For a closer approximation, see e.g. 
Karttunen 1977.) Where Flo said that smoking is dangerous, knowing 
what Flo said amounts to knowing that Flo said that smoking is 
dangerous, rather than knowing that smoking is dangerous. So, knowing 
what was said is not a form of first-order engagement with that which 
was said. By contrast, accepting what a speaker said is an attitude with a 
propositional content picked out by a nominal phrase or relative clause. 
It’s a matter of accepting that p, where that p is identical with that which 
the speaker said. For instance, where Flo said that smoking is addictive, 
accepting what Flo said is accepting that smoking is addictive, rather 
than accepting that Flo said that smoking is addictive. So, accepting is a 
form of first-order engagement with what was said. It’s therefore a 
pressing question for the proponent of the propositional knowledge 
account how ordinary speakers make the required transition from what 
they take in through understanding—according to that account, 
knowledge of what was said—to a form of engagement with what was 
said that can provide an appropriate basis for acceptance or rejection. 
That is, the proponent of the knowledge account must explain how one 
makes the required transition from second-order engagement to 
appropriate first-order engagement with what was said. 
If the required result is to be secured in a way that supports the 
propositional knowledge account over alternatives, it must be secured 
on the basis of inference over known propositional contents. That is, 
the transition must be a matter of knowledge- (or epistemic standing-) 
preserving inference. Articulating the required inference must proceed 
via instances of principles able to mediate between the proposition 
known through understanding—an instance of the proposition-schema: 
that S has said that p—and the proposition accepted on that basis—an 
instance of: that p. The most natural principles able to mediate that 
transition are what I shall call saying-equivalence and propositional-
equivalence: 
 
(Saying-equivalence) S said that p if and only if what S said 
= that p. 
(Propositional-equivalence)  That p is true if and only if p. 
 
(As an alternative, the principles might be formulated as co-entailments, 
rather than bi-conditionals, and the discussion that follows reformulated 
mutatis mutandis.) By exploiting instances of the two principles, a subject, 
A, can effect instances of the following schematic transition (
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various principles and other sources of warrant that A exploits in 
making steps in the transition recorded in parentheses): 
 
(P1) A knows what S said. [Via understanding, according to 
the propositional knowledge account.] 
(P2) A knows that what S said is true. [Concessive 
assumption.] 
(P3) A knows that S said that p. [From P1, analysis of knowing 
what S said.] 
(P4) A knows that what S said = that p. [From P3, saying-
equivalence.] 
(P5) A knows that that p is true. [P2, P4, substitution of 
identicals.] 
(P6) A accepts that p. [P5, propositional-equivalence.] 
(P7) A accepts what S said. [P6, analysis of accepting what S said.] 
 
If that is the way that the proponent of the knowledge account seeks to 
ensure the transition from understanding to an appropriate target for 
acceptance, then they’re required to view the two principles—saying-
equivalence and propositional-equivalence—as available to, and exploited by, 
A. That is, they’re required to take the principles to be cognized or 
acknowledged by A with appropriate epistemic standing. The principles 
must either be objects of A’s knowledge or be respected by knowledge 
sustaining transitions in A’s thinking. And A must exploit their 
cognition of the principles, through displaying a suitable sensitivity to 
the principles, in the course of coming to accept what they take in 
through understanding. If adherence to the principles is to deliver 
knowledge, then cognition of the principles must not be an idle wheel 
with respect to the required transitions. The point isn’t of course that A 
must consciously run through the steps of the proposed transition. 
Rather, the minimal point is that the course of A’s thinking must be 
appropriately sensitive to the obtaining of the principles. 
The objection to this treatment is not that the required principles 
are false. Rather, the objection is that it’s implausible to suppose that an 
audience’s capacity to exploit their understanding in order to accept 
what was said depends upon their exploiting such principles. The 
required principles are, ultimately, principles of semantic descent and, 
so, are required only because of the initial semantic ascent built into the 
propositional knowledge account of understanding. The propositional 
knowledge account over-intellectualizes the warrant for testimony by 
requiring semantic ascent in its second-order engagement with content, 
and then requiring principles of semantic descent in order to achieve the 
first-order engagement with content that is the product of successful 
uptake of testimony. A treatment able to avoid that inferential dogleg 
would clearly be preferable. 
The entertaining account sustains such a treatment. Because the 
entertaining account avoids the semantic ascent built into the 
knowledge account, it has no need to exploit principles of semantic 
descent. Instead, it treats warrant as transmitted immediately from 
understanding what was said in an assertion to accepting it. 
According to the entertaining account, a subject’s understanding 
what was said is a matter of their entertaining what was said in a way 
that depends constitutively on its having been said, and in such a way as 
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to put the suitably equipped in a position to know what was said. Thus, 
if someone moves reliably from so entertaining a propositional content 
to accepting it, then they will reliably be accepting precisely what was 
said. Furthermore, we have that understanding what was said presents 
an invitation to acceptance, so that it is of the nature of the attitude 
involved in understanding to underwrite immediate transitions to states 
of acceptance that depend constitutively on the initial understanding. 
Such transitions involve nothing more than a natural shift in attitude 
towards an entertained content, from merely entertaining to accepting 
it. (We might think of such shifts as somewhat akin to changes in 
degrees of belief, on a treatment of such changes as involving the 
modulation of particular states, rather than as involving the sequential 
replacement of one state by another.) Since we are allowing that our 
subject knows that what was said is true, it is clear that in reliably 
accepting the content that they understood to have been said, they are 
reliably exploiting that warrant. Moreover, they are doing so in a way 
that, at each stage, reliably depends on its having been said. Thus, the 
entertaining account can provide a plausible treatment of the 
transmission of warrant for accepting that what was said is true to 
accepting what was said. 
The proposed treatment bears comparison with other similar 
cases. One such case is the acquisition of knowledge on the basis of 
seeing an object. In that case, seeing an object serves immediately to 
trigger the reliable exercise of conceptual abilities. Since the seeing can 
guarantee for one the presence of the seen object, the exercise of 
conceptual abilities can exploit that guarantee in order to constitute 
knowledge. The truth guarantee established by seeing underwrites a 
truth guarantee for appropriate concept application, and so provides an 
entitlement for that application.  Another such case is the acquisition of 
knowledge via inference. In that case, knowing that p and knowing that 
if p, then q, can serve immediately to sponsor accepting that q. The 
knowledge guarantees that it is true that p and true that if p, then q. 
Competent deduction exploits those guarantees, together with the 
guarantee of truth preservation underwritten by appropriate sensitivity 
to the nature of the conditional, in order to guarantee the truth of what 
is accepted, and thus transmit an entitlement for that acceptance. In 
this case, the inference takes one immediately from merely entertaining 
the proposition that q, as the consequent of a known conditional, to 
accepting that q. The case is therefore closely akin to the proposed 
treatment, on which a form of entertaining that p can immediately 
sponsor accepting that p, without exploiting additional inferential 
abilities. (For relevant discussion, see Peacocke 2003: 52–73.) 
The entertaining-based treatment in effect simulates the 
knowledge-based treatment. According to the entertaining account of 
understanding, understanding can make it possible for the suitably 
equipped to acquire knowledge about what was said. In order to do so, 
understanding must furnish the subject with suitable guarantees of 
truth. But knowledge about what was said can sponsor the transmission 
of such guarantees to states of accepting what was said. So, if 
understanding can guarantee the truth of views about what was said, 
then understanding can directly sponsor the transmission of those 
guarantees. For the capacity of knowledge to sponsor those guarantees 
depends only on the way in which it guarantees the facts, and not on the 
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specific conceptual resources that it deploys. Any other state able to 
guarantee those facts—be it a state of seeing or a state of 
understanding—would serve just as well. In particular, the entertaining-
based treatment performs the service at a lower cost. 
Crucially, the proposed treatment draws only on capacities that 
are required for the distinctive form of entertaining of expressed 
content that the account takes to constitute accepting what was said on 
the basis of having understood it. Accepting what was said is a first 
order attitude to that which was said, rather than a second order 
attitude about what was said. Thus, in order to accept what was said, 
one need not possess the conceptual abilities required to think about 
what was said. The present treatment holds that the same is true of 
understanding what was said. Where what was said was that p, both 
understanding and acceptance require the ability to think that p, and so 
acceptance on the basis of understanding requires the same ability. 
Understanding requires the further ability to have that thinking 
triggered in the right way by confrontation with someone saying that p. 
But it requires no conceptual abilities that are not anyway required for 
accepting that p. And since it is of the nature of understanding to lead 
to acceptance, accepting that p on the basis of understanding requires 
no additional powers. It therefore sustains an account of testimonial 
warrant that is less intellectually demanding than any treatment 
supported by the propositional knowledge account. 
Thus, it is possible to give a treatment of the role of understanding 
testimonial warrant for accepting what was said that does not depend on 
the possession of abilities to think about what was said, or abilities to 
make competent inferences from knowledge about what was said, in 
order to accept what was said. Since the propositional knowledge 
account holds that understanding requires such abilities, it provides an 
over-intellectualized treatment of testimonial warrant. 
 
 
4. Alternatives to the entertaining account. There are other accounts 
that agree with the entertaining account in denying that understanding 
is a form of propositional knowledge. Comparison with some of those 
accounts may help to illuminate some of the distinctive features of the 
entertaining account. I’ll focus on the accounts presented by Dean 
Pettit (2002) and Elizabeth Fricker (2003). Both accounts agree with the 
entertaining account that understanding is not a form of propositional 
knowledge. However, attention to the central feature of the 
entertaining account—that is, its treatment of understanding as a first-
order attitude to what was said—reveals critical ambiguities in their 
presentations. On one disambiguation, their accounts are less developed 
versions of the entertaining account. On the other disambiguation, they 
agree with the propositional knowledge account that understanding 
comprises attitudes about what was said, and so face the same objection 
from over-intellectualization as that account. 
 
 
4.1. Pettit’s proposal. Pettit presents his positive proposal in the 
following passages: 
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When someone assertively utters the sentence ‘there is water on Mars’, 
it will seem to you as though the speaker said that there is water on 
Mars. As a competent speaker of English, you cannot help having this 
impression…. But that you have this impression is enough for you to 
count as understanding the word…. (Pettit 2002: 546.) 
 
Whatever turns out to be the nature of the psychological states that 
constitute our understanding of language, it is natural to suppose that 
those states are representational. The view that understanding is some 
sort of non-propositional knowledge implies that our understanding of a 
language consists in psychological states that are not representational, 
and specifically that they do not represent the semantic properties of the 
language. And nothing I have said here suggests that that is the case…. 
The point to emphasize is not that linguistic understanding is not 
propositional knowledge (in contrast with other sorts of knowledge) but 
rather that it is not propositional knowledge (in contrast with other 
propositional attitudes). The arguments presented here leave it open 
whether linguistic understanding is some other sort of propositional 
attitude. (Pettit 2002: 548–549, his emphasis.) 
 
Pettit’s focus is on understanding word and sentence meaning, rather 
than understanding what was said, and we shouldn’t assume that he 
intended to commit to any view about the latter. However, one natural 
extrapolation would include the view that understanding a sentence 
involves being disposed to understand what is said by uses of the 
sentence, where understanding what was said is characterized in the 
following way. First, in a case in which someone said that p, 
understanding what was said would consist in its seeming to one as 
though they said that p. Second, understanding what was said is a 
propositional attitude. Third, understanding what was said consists in 
psychological states that represent what was said. 
From the present perspective, the extrapolated proposal is 
underspecified at two key points. The first concerns the conditions in 
which its seeming as though someone said that p would count as 
understanding what they said. Is it required that one’s impressions 
correspond with what was in fact said? Is mere correspondence enough, 
or must additional conditions be imposed in order to rule out analogues 
of veridical hallucination? The entertaining account is shaped here by 
plausible connections between understanding and being in a position to 
know what was said. If the extrapolated proposal were developed in 
accord with the same constraints, it might become a version of the 
entertaining account. If not, then the proposal would need to deal 
differently with our natural expectation that those who understand what 
was said are typically in a position to know what was said.  
The second way in which the account is underspecified concerns 
whether what is said is taken to figure in the propositional attitudes that 
constitute understanding in a first-order or a second-order way. If it 
figures in a first-order way, then the account agrees on that point with 
the entertaining account. If it figures in a second-order way—as 
suggested by the characterization of the operative seeming and the 
appeal to representing what was said—then the proposal would disagree 
with the entertaining account at the same fundamental point as the 
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propositional knowledge view, and so would be subject to a version of 
the objection from over-intellectualization. 
 
 
4.2. Fricker’s proposal. Fricker seeks to provide an interlocking 
account of what it is to understand a language and what it is to 
understand what is said by uses of the language. On her view, 
understanding a language consists in possessing a certain type of reliable 
capacity to understand what is said by uses of the language. 
Understanding what was said by a particular use of the language consists 
in enjoying “a correct quasi-perceptual representation of the content 
and force” carried by the utterance, through exercise of the capacity 
that constitutes understanding the language. (Fricker 2003: 345–6.) It 
would be consistent with the entertaining account to adopt Fricker’s 
account of the way understanding a language is connected with 
understanding what was said. The two accounts disagree, if at all, only 
about the nature of states of understanding what was said.  
Whether the accounts disagree about states of understanding 
depends on Fricker’s more detailed characterization of the quasi-
perceptual representations that she takes to constitute those states. 
These, she writes, are 
 
…conscious mental states distinct from belief with three key perception-
like properties: (1) phenomenologically they have the nature of 
experiences, perceptions of meaning; (2) where the hearer forms a belief 
about what is said, her understanding-experience will be the proximate 
(perhaps simultaneous) cause of this, and feature in the causal 
explanation of her belief; (3) alongside (2), in fluent language use 
understanding-experiences also play a key epistemic role in grounding 
perceptual beliefs. On the proposed account of how knowledge of what 
has been said is such, a hearer’s understanding-experience of the meaning 
of an utterance she hears grounds her belief about what has been said, in 
a way exactly parallel to that in which visual experience, with its 
objective content, grounds visual perceptual beliefs. (Fricker 2003: 329, 
citing Brewer 1999 in connection with the way visual experience can 
ground beliefs.) 
 
The entertaining account includes versions of (2) and (3). Whether the 
accounts agree about (1) depends most fundamentally on Fricker’s 
account of the connection between her quasi-perceptions and what was 
said. If the quasi-perceptions have what was said as their first-order 
contents, then the accounts agree. If, by contrast, the quasi-perceptions 
have what was said only as their second-order contents—and, so, have 
contents that are about, rather than identical with, what was said—the 
accounts disagree, and Fricker’s account would be subject to a version of 
the same charge of over-intellectualization as the propositional 
knowledge account. 
Fricker’s talk of quasi-perceptual representations of content, and 
her analogy with the objective content of visual experience, suggests 
that her quasi-perceptual states have contents that are about what was 
said. For those who hold that visual experience has objective content 
typically also hold (with Brewer 1999) that that content is about the 
things that are seen. On such a view, a visual experience of a cat would 
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have an objective content the correctness of which was dependent on 
the presence and disposition of a cat. Similarly, a quasi-perception of 
what was said would have an objective content the correctness of which 
was dependent on the occurrence and content of an episode of speech. 
If so, the view would be relevantly similar to the propositional 
knowledge account, on which understanding what was said consists in 
knowledge with just such an objective content, and, so, would be subject 
to the same objection. 
However, although the majority of Fricker’s characterizations 
treat her quasi-perceptions as second-order representations of what was 
said, some are ostensibly closer to the entertaining account: 
 
…when one hears, with uptake—either literally, or in one’s mind’s ear, as 
it were—an utterance of a sentence of a language one is fluent in, this 
constitutes, cognitive-functionally speaking, an occurrence of the 
thought which is the meaning of that utterance, the proposition 
represented by it… the hearing [of the utterance] itself, when it is heard 
with ‘uptake’, constitutes a thought of the proposition which is the 
meaning of [the utterance]. [The utterance] itself is the vehicle in 
consciousness through entertaining which the subject thinks of that 
proposition. (Fricker 2003: 360–361.) 
 
At first blush, this passage might seem to accord with the entertaining 
account. However, the evidence is mixed. Although Fricker appeals to 
the “occurrence of a thought which is the meaning of that utterance”, 
she also characterizes the subject as thinking “of that proposition” (my 
emphasis), rather than simply entertaining the proposition. 
Furthermore, we noted earlier that it is consistent with a second-order 
treatment of understanding to allow that understanding entails a form of 
first-order entertaining of what was said. (See again Burge 2005: 174ff.) 
What is distinctive of the entertaining account is its commitment to the 
converse entailment: a distinctive form of first-order entertaining of 
what is said entails understanding. The balance of evidence suggests, 
therefore, that Fricker’s account treats understanding as a form of 
second-order engagement with what was said. It is therefore subject to 
the objection from over-intellectualization. (Fricker’s appeal to quasi-
perceptual representations of content and force suggests that she may 
have rejected an entertaining account on the basis of the worry about 
force to which I responded at the end of §2.) 
 
 
4. Conclusion. The ability to understand what was said is a central 
epistemic power. I’ve attempted to make some progress in uncovering 
the nature of its outputs, instances of understanding what was said. In 
§2, I presented a novel account of understanding what was said—the 
entertaining account—according to which understanding is a distinctive 
attitude towards that which was said. In §3, I sought to test that 
account against its major competitor, the propositional knowledge 
account, by considering their respective treatments of the role of 
understanding in transmitting testimonial warrant. I argued that the 
treatment supporting the propositional knowledge account is over-
intellectualized. The entertaining account underwrites a more 
economical treatment, a treatment better aligned with the minimal 
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intellectual resources required for accepting what we are told. In §4, I 
considered two alternative accounts and argued that insofar as they treat 
understanding as an attitude about what was said, they are subject to the 
objections brought against the propositional knowledge account. I hope 
to have done enough to show that the entertaining account is worthy of 
further attention and that understanding what was said may be possible 
in the absence of propositional knowledge of what was said. 
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